By Bob Emiliani
This article is from the Superfactory Archives, an archive of content from the Superfactory website that existed from 1997 to 2012.
Between 80 and 90 years ago, the leaders of the then-popular Scientific Management movement, a precursor to Lean management, began revealing their views about why most managers resisted improvement efforts. What they learned then can provide insights into how we can more effectively advance Lean management.
The development of Toyota’s production and overall management system bears a small gratitude to the ideas of early management thinkers and pioneers of Scientific Management, an offshoot of mechanical engineering, which would later become known as industrial engineering. While it is likely that Kiichiro Toyoda and Eiji Toyoda (both degreed mechanical engineers), and Taiichi Ohno (who studied mechanical engineering) had basic familiarity with Frederick Taylor’s 1911 work, The Principles of Scientific Management [1], and Frank Gilbreth’s motion studies [2], these ideas were reduced to practice through vigorous internal development by Mr. Ohno starting in the late 1930s [3] as well as from outside sources. These external sources included the U.S. government sponsored post-World War II “Training Within Industry” program in 1951 [4] followed by consultant Shigeo Shingo four years later [5].
Mr. Shingo, in his book The Shingo Production Management System [6], acknowledges the influence of Taylor and Gilbreth in his work. In relation to Toyota Motor Corporation, this influence is reflected in the “P-course” (production course) that Mr. Shingo taught to about 3000 Toyota engineers between 1955 and 1980 [7]. Mr. Ohno said that Henry Ford’s production system was his biggest influence [8]. However, Charles Sorenson, Mr. Ford’s operations vice president says he and Henry Ford knew nothing of Frederick Taylor’s work and that it had no influence in the creation of Ford’s production system [9]. Nevertheless, Taylor and Gilbreth’s work contributed in recognizable ways to the evolution of Toyota’s management system. But let’s not forget that Mr. Ohno was clearly its originator, as shown by the timeline contained in his book Toyota Production System [8,10].
Scientific Management made great contributions to American industrial management practice in the early 1900s. As might be expected, there were some successes and many failures. The leaders of the Scientific Management movement began writing their observations of these successes and especially the failures, particularly between 1912 and 1930. From these writings, we can learn what went wrong and how observers and practitioners comprehended and characterized management’s errors. Knowledge of their struggles can help us improve our response to today’s challenges.
Forrest Cardullo graduated from Cornell University in 1901 as a mechanical engineer. His classmate was Willis Carrier who invented air conditioning a year after graduating from college [11]. Not much is known about Mr. Cardullo between 1901 and 1910, other than that he wrote several papers related to machine design and heat engines, and received an appointment as associate professor of machine design at Syracuse University in 1907. He wrote a book that was published in 1911 titled Practical Thermodynamics [12] while he was a professor of mechanical engineering at a college in New Hampshire. The book apparently sold well. Cardullo went on become the chair of the new mechanical engineering department The University of Texas at Austin in 1914, starting out with a staff of just one full-time instructor [13].
Sometime between 1901 and 1911, Cardullo gained significant knowledge and possibly practical experience in Scientific Management. In 1912 and 1913, Cardullo wrote a 3-part paper titled “Industrial Administration and Scientific Management.” This paper was originally published in a journal called Machinery , and later reprinted in a book as part of a collection of the best papers on Scientific Management up to 1914 [14]. Cardullo wrote eloquently about management and had a keen eye for detail – particularly in relation to difficulties managers had in breaking free of the current state. He begins by providing some historical background on modern industrial management:
“…the art of industrial administration was stationary for a long period of time. In spite of tremendous changes in our social, economic and industrial systems, we have been content to adapt or modify methods which originated thousands of years ago…. The common system of industrial administration is constructed of the surviving remains of Greek slavery, Roman militarism, Saxon serfdom, the mediaeval guilds, and various other historical oddities, slightly altered to adapt them to the twentieth century conditions, and engrafted on one another in very much the same way as the additions to [an] old [New England] house. This system of management has been a growth in which each manager appropriated those developments of the past which appealed to him. Sometimes methods were adopted as a result of a carefully and properly conducted investigation, but nine times out of ten they were adopted because the manager ‘guessed’ they were the best ones. We will designate [this] system of management… as ‘conventional management’… the distinguishing feature of conventional management is the acceptance of something already in existence and the choosing, by guess, between methods which have been developed by some one else.” (pp. 50-51)
Thus, Cardullo laments the “cherry picking” of management methods and tools in the absence of any significant thought as to which ones were better and why. He is also saying that most managers use an “arts” approach to management, rather than a scientific approach. What differentiates the two is the weakness, non-existence, or selective uptake by managers of feedback in cases where management is understood by the practitioner as being almost wholly an art (as in “the art of management”). In other words, managers who view management as an art often ignore feedback.
He goes on to describe Scientific Management:
“…[Scientific management] has been developed by the engineer. Scientific management aims at the careful investigation of every problem of the industrial world in order to determine its best solution [15]. It is not content to rely upon records, or upon the judgment of the most experienced workman. It brings to its aid all the resources of science… Scientific management is not an invention but a discovery. It is the application of the scientific method of research to the problems of the industrial world.” (pp. 51-52)
What is the scientific method? It is “…is a body of techniques for investigating phenomena and acquiring new knowledge, as well as for correcting and integrating previous knowledge. It is based on gathering observable, empirical, measurable evidence, subject to the principles of reasoning” [16]. The four basic steps are: 1) observe a phenomenon; 2) formulate a hypothesis to explain the phenomenon; 3) conduct experiments to prove or disprove hypothesis; and 4) reach a conclusion that validates or modifies the hypothesis. Kaizen, done correctly, utilizes the scientific method. We all know kaizen to be a practical process; therefore so is the scientific method. Many managers ignore this and may say things like: “We’re business people, not scientists! The scientific method does not apply to us.” This is further evidence that they view management as mostly an art with little or no room for the practice of science – where science is often incorrectly viewed as theoretical, and thus managers fail to recognize important information emanating from different sources of feedback.
Cardullo notes that:
“Scientific management has been applied to many different kinds of work, and seems to be almost if not quite universal in its application.” (p. 52)
He goes on to say:
“In many shops, inefficiency has nothing to do with the workmen, but is entirely chargeable to management.” (p. 55)
This parallels Frederick Taylor’s observation in 1912 that “…nine-tenths of our trouble has been to ‘bring’ those on the management’s side to do their fair share of the work and only one-tenth of our trouble has come on the workman’s side” [17].
Cardullo then describes how managers commonly misunderstand Scientific Management:
“I have heard a good many men say, in regard to scientific management, that they have managed their affairs scientifically without knowing they were scientific. However, when I have come to talk over the matter at length with them, I find what they mean is that some of the inefficiencies not usually obvious had become apparent to them, and that they had adopted some of the methods of scientific management in attempting to eliminate the inefficiencies which had come to their attention. This is a very different matter from installing a system of scientific management, although the efficiency of a good many plants had been greatly increased in this manner.
However, the men [managers] of whom I speak do not understand what scientific management is. They think that scientific management is a collection of best methods… A great deal of harm is likely to come from the unintelligent employment of some of the methods of scientific management by such men, even if they are acting in the best of faith. The introduction of some of the methods will often cause antagonism among the workmen, and they will sometimes prove inefficient under new conditions. In either case scientific management is blamed for the failure…” (p. 57)
Sound familiar? Scientific Management helped managers see waste that was once invisible to them. But they viewed Scientific Management as a set of tools and methods and not as a management system – much like today where most managers view Lean as a set of tools and techniques and not as a management system. Sure, some improvement will occur through the application of tools, but it is not at all the same as applying the system in its entirety. And when managers fumble a Lean implementation, Lean is blamed for the failure. Cardullo’s passages parallel what Taiichi Ohno told us about 75 years later [18]:
“Companies make a big mistake in implementing the Toyota production system thinking that it is just a production method. The Toyota production method won't work unless it is used as an overall management system. The Toyota production system is not something that can be used only on the production floors. The belief that it is only a production method is fundamentally wrong…. those who decide to implement the Toyota production system must be fully committed. If you try to adopt only the ‘good parts’, you'll fail.”
Today, we are finally discovering Lean as it has always been: a management system. Unfortunately, it has taken over 25 years for managers and Lean proponents to move beyond the “tool age.”
Finally, Cardullo enlightens us on the causes of industrial inefficiency that help perpetuate the current state and management’s inability to correctly understand and apply Scientific Management. He does this in a dispassionate, clinical manner, with the aim of understanding the obstacles which must be overcome. To do this, he cites three major categories of problems endemic to conventional management: those caused by the employer (i.e. managers), the workmen, and America’s political and industrial system. We will focus on the first category, which consists of nine items. Cardullo, who was about 33 years old when he wrote this article, was very blunt [19].
Item 1: Mental laziness
“The first and most prolific source of inefficiency is mental laziness. Most of us dislike to think. While a good many of us will devote a spare hour now and then to the consideration of some interesting subject, no man [manager] will, if he can avoid it, devote two hours a day, not to mention eight hours a day, to the task of devising and comparing methods of work. That kind of thing is entirely too strenuous to suit the average officer of administration. In the average plant, each officer places upon the shoulders of his underlings the burden of detail for which he himself ought to be responsible… the workman is no fonder of thinking than the management… He is not to be blamed for so doing, because he has merely followed the example of the management… Conventional management is fundamentally wrong, in that it compels the workmen to originate the [work] methods, and leaves to the management only the task of criticism.” (pp. 67-68)
Simply put, managers have to understand the difference between value-added work and what looks like work but is actually waste. They can only learn this by doing.
Item 2: Prejudice against so-called non-productive labor
“A second course of inefficiency is a dislike on the part of most managers to employ a considerable executive staff to direct the efforts of the workmen. The management balks at such a staff, and claims that ‘non-productive’ labor is a necessary evil if you have to employ it, and an unnecessary evil if you can do with out it. In the old days draftsmen were regarded as an unnecessary evil, and the designing was done by rule-of-thumb and the head patternmaker. Experience has shown that Johnny Pencilpusher is not an evil, nor is he unnecessary, and that it pays to employ him… The men who direct the work of the shop are just as necessary as the men who make the designs… The labor of the planning department is just as truly productive as the labor of the drafting department, the machine department, or the erecting department. A new attitude in regards to the employment of indirect labor is a pre-requisite to greater efficiency…” (p. 69)
In contrast to 1914, the prejudice today is clearly against productive labor. Cardullo is no doubt annoyed with the recently-created standard cost (absorption) accounting systems that classify workers in ways that are convenient for accountants but foment dysfunction among company managers. Cardullo sees business as a system and not isolated parts labeled as “direct,” indirect,” or as drafting, planning, or production. He wants managers to understand that they need all the parts, not just some, for the business to work properly, and that it is harmful for managers to favor one class of people or activity over another. Unfortunately, we still suffer today from top managers who favor one class, function, or activity over others (i.e., those in the in-group), which marginalized the interests of people in the out-group and undercuts teamwork.
Item 3: Timidity of capital
“A third fault of management is timidity. Capital seems to be ruled by fear quite as often as by judgment. Men dislike to risk their money in something which they feel is not absolutely sure to bring adequate returns… so the present-day employer is fearful of assuming the expense incident to proper management, even though it can be shown that great gains ought to be realized from proper administration.” (pp. 69-70)
Then as now, managers want bulletproof evidence of savings and benefits before agreeing to depart from the current state of conventional management practices [20]. Another manifestation of this is the widely-held view that the introduction of Lean management as a cost, and not as a savings. Related to that is a strong desire to “bean-count” Lean activities; to determine the return on investment or internal rate of return for kaizens. If the kaizen result does not financially pay back what has been put into it, then there is no kaizen. Managers who do this fail to realize their decision is self-centered and made without consideration of end-use customers. They also fail to understand that kaizen is a long-term process of learning how to improve, and that no kaizen means there will be no learning or improvement. Inevitably, the company will one day find itself in trouble, but the people will have failed to learn things that could have avoided the calamity altogether or help overcome the problems more quickly.
Item 4: Lack of foresight
“This brings us to a fourth fault of management, which is a lack of foresight. The management, in performing the work of today, fails to make allowances for the needs of next week, or the growth of next year… The lack of definite and far- reaching plans for future work is not felt at the time that such plans should be made, but it is felt later.” (p. 70)
Short-term thinking is not a new phenomenon.
Item 5: Mental inertia and lack of adaptability
“A fifth fault of management is one which may best be described as ‘mental inertia.’ Managers tend to follow methods which have been satisfactory in the past, but which changing conditions have made unsatisfactory for present requirements. Whenever a new invention of any importance is introduced into the shop the conditions of work are greatly altered. The introduction of high speed steel [by Frederick Taylor [21]] is a case in point… in most cases the management will attempt to get along with the least possible change in equipment, and in methods of work and administration. Many men resist change simply because it is change, in spite of the fact that the change may be desirable.” (pp. 70-71)
Senior managers are human and have fears and concerns just like anyone else. One would hope that managers – mostly well paid and educated, possessing a wider view (hopefully), and concerned about the future of the business – would not allow themselves to get stuck in the current state and fail to see the need for change around the time that it is necessary. Unfortunately, this happens all the time.
Item 6: Lack of study of the industry
“A sixth and probably one of the greatest of all causes of inefficiency is the fact that the management very seldom makes a careful study of the industry… When it is all said and done, it will be found that most managers want some one else to do the experimenting [studies], feeling that by doing so they can participate in the profits of such work without sharing is expenses.” (p. 72)
A mark of professionalism is dedicated study and practice in the field for which one has responsibility. With daily discipline and great effort, the result will be fewer errors and better outcomes. Instead, Cardullo says managers frequently lack professionalism and act as “free riders” – people who gain something for nothing – which indicates that their priorities are misplaced.
Item 7: Systems of rewarding labor
“A seventh source of inefficiency in many industrial plants is the system of wage payment adopted. It would be hard to devise wage systems better calculated to limit efficiency than the two which are in most common use; namely, the day wage plan and the piece work plan with frequent cuts.” (pp. 72-73)
This issue has not gone away; it has just taken on different forms. The first big problem today is the compensation systems for rewarding top managers, not production laborers. The second big problem today is the huge gap between average worker pay and benefits in relation to what senior managers receive, and that real wages for production workers adjusted for inflation have been flat for more than two decades despite a 43% increase in productivity between 1990 and 2006 [22]. The most significant thing in common between then and now is that the gains have not been widely shared with labor.
Item 8: “Holier than thou” spirit of some employees
“An eighth cause of inefficiency is one which is happily becoming less frequent. It is a disposition on the part of some employees to regard their workmen as being of a lower order of humanity than themselves… I have heard them speak of their workmen as ‘beasts’ and ‘ignorant brutes.’ No man who regards his employees in that light can be persuaded to adopt scientific management nor can he bring the efficiency of his plant to a high standard, because such feelings will unconsciously affect his attitude in dealing with his employees, arouse their antagonism, and destroy that feeling of cooperation which is the essential basis of high efficiency.” (p. 74).
Today we don’t refer to production workers as “beasts” and “ignorant brutes,” but we do refer to each other in less colorful but still condescending ways that give people reasons to withdraw from participation: shop rats, bean counter, engineering weenie, parts chaser, HR do-nothing, ivory tower lawyer, IT geek, marketing puke, quality pains-in-the-asses, etc. The outcome is the same: antagonism that undercuts our ability to function as teams in business – a quintessentially cooperative human activity. “Behavioral waste,” a term that I coined almost 10 years ago [23], is toxic to Lean management.
Item 9: Avarice of the management
“The last source of inefficiency of which I will speak is avarice on the part of management… Not only will avarice prevent the adoption of scientific management in a great many cases, but it is also very likely to give scientific management a black eye by adopting some of its methods, without adopting its spirit. An avaricious employer finds himself coming out second best in competition with one who utilizes scientific management. He attempts to appropriate the experience of his competitor in the same spirit in which he imitates his trade-marks, copies his designs, and steals his methods of work. Now while it is possible to imitate a trade-mark or steal a method, it is not possible to imitate or to steal the scientific habit of mind or the spirit of fair play, which lie at the basis of scientific management… the extraordinary performances possible under scientific management will never be achieved in the shops of the avaricious employer because knowledge alone will not lead workmen to increase their efficiency.” (pp. 75-76).
Cardullo is saying that merely copying a competitor that practices Scientific Management well will not assure success. These days, we would say that copying the tools of Lean – i.e. practicing only the “Continuous Improvement” principle – is insufficient. Management must also practice the “Respect for People” principle [24,25].
At the end of this section, Cardullo says:
“I have endeavored merely to point out the fact that such faults exist, that they can be remedied, and that before [genuine] scientific management can be applied to an industry, they must be remedied.” (p. 76)
Likewise, the faults must be remedied before genuine Lean management can be applied.
Notes:
[1] F.W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management , Harper & Brothers Publishers, New York, NY, 1911. In a nutshell, Scientific
Management can be described as a system of production management that, if done correctly, resulted in a much more efficient
batch-and-queue (push) production system; 2-3 times more efficient than basic batch-and-queue production. Its application was
later extended to non-production activities and to non-manufacturing industries. Its main foci were “betterment” of the work and
“cooperation” among the management and the workers. Some of its principles, methods, and tools are the same or similar to that
found in Lean management.
[2] F Gilbreth, Motion Study , D. Van Nostrand Co., New York, NY, 1911
[3] Ohno’s knowledge of Taylor and Gilbreth works is described by Michael Cusumano as follows: “…the ‘time and motion’ studies he
used to examine workers and machines came from the United States. His first encounter with these techniques occurred during 1937-
1938 when a supervisor at Toyoda Spinning and Weaving asked him to study the latest American management methods and to report
on those he thought would be useful for manufacturing thread. Ōno read several textbooks and articles that contained a variety of ideas
and theories, but nothing practical. He then decided that the best way to improve the Toyoda factory was to put the textbooks aside, go
to the shop floor, and study the plant and workers in operation.” M. Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry: Technology and
Management at Nissan and Toyota , The Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1985, p. 272
[4] J. Huntzinger, “,” June 2005, and A. Smalley, “TWI
Influence on TPS and Kaizen,” May 2006
[5] Another source who may have informed Kiichiro Toyoda, Eiji Toyoda, and Taiichi Ohno about Scientific Management in the 1920s or
1930s was Yōichi Ueno (1883-1957). Ueno was a prominent advocate of Scientific Management in pre-World War II Japan. He was a
writer, educator, and management consultant who published many books that interpreted Scientific Management’s technical and human
dimensions for his Japanese audience. See W. Tustsui, “The Way of Efficiency: Ueno Yōichi and Scientific Management in Twentieth-
Century Japan,” Modern Asian Studies , Vo. 35, No. 2, pp. 441-467, 2001
[6] S. Shingo, The Shingo Production Management System: Improving Process Functions , Productivity Press, Portland, OR, 1992
[7] S. Shingo, Study of ‘Toyota’ Production System from Industrial Engineering Viewpoint, Japan Management Association, Tokyo, Japan,
November 1981, distributed by Productivity Press, Inc., Cambridge, MA, p. 17
[8] T. Ohno, Toyota Production System , Productivity Press, Portland, OR, 1988
[9] C. Sorensen, My Forty Years with Ford , W.W. Norton Co., Inc., New York, NY, 1956, p. 41. Sorensen says: “One of the hardest-to-down
myths about the evolution of mass production at Ford is one which credits much of the accomplishment to ‘scientific management.’ No
one at Ford – not Mr. Ford, Couzens, Flanders, Wills, Pete Martin, nor I – was acquainted with the theories of the ‘father of scientific
management,’ Frederick W. Taylor. Years later I ran across a quotation from a two-volume book about Taylor by Frank Barkley Copley,
who reports a visit Taylor made to Detroit late in 1914, nearly a year after the moving assembly line had been installed at out Highland
Park plant. Taylor expressed surprise to find that Detroit industrialists ‘had undertaken to install the principles of scientific management
without the aid of experts.’ To my mind, this unconscious admission by an expert is expert testimony on the futility of too great reliance
on experts and should forever dispose of the legend that Taylor’s ideas had any influence at Ford.”
[10] See A. Smalley, “A Brief Investigation into the Origins of the Toyota Production System,”
June 2006 and A. Smalley, “Shigeo Shingo’s
Influence on TPS: An Interview with Mr. Isao Kato,“ April 2006
[11] For a brief biography of Willis Carrier, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Willis_Carrier or Willis Carrier: Father of Air Conditioning ,
M. Ingels, Carrier Corporation, 1991 (reprint of 1952 edition)
[12] F. Cardullo, Practical Thermodynamics: A Treatise on the Theory and Design of Heat Engines, Refrigeration Machinery, and Other
Power-Plant Apparatus , McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York, NY, 1911
[13] See https://www.me.utexas.edu/visitor/building.shtml
[14] C. B. Thompson, Scientific Management: A Collection of the More Significant Articles Describing The Taylor System of Management ,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1914. Forrest Cardullo’s paper “Industrial Administration and Scientific Management”
appears on pages 49-83. The original paper appeared in Machinery , vol. 18, p. 843 and 931, 1912, and in vol. 19, p. 18, 1913.
[15] In the early days of Scientific Management, engineers searched for the “one best way” to do a job and typically did not seek input
from the laborers who actually did the work. It was not long before some engineers and managers realized that workers possess
valuable knowledge should be listened to. In time, the search for the “one best way” became more of a collaborative effort in some
organizations. Also, the notion of “continuous improvement” was not understood in the early days of Scientific Management. Only
later did some people realize that processes can be improved many times.
[16] See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method
[17] Scientific Management: Comprising Shop Management, Principles of Scientific Management, Testimony Before the House
Committee , F.W. Taylor, with foreword by Harlow S. Person, Harper & Brothers Publishers, New York, NY, 1947, p. 43
[18] T. Ohno in NPS: New Production System , by I. Shinohara, Productivity Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988, pp. 153, 155
[19] Being blunt carriers the risk that top managers will be offended and therefore not listen. On the other hand, not being blunt risks
perpetuating the current state which is bad for all stakeholders. It seems that Cardullo, and many others in the decades that followed,
felt that people in leadership positions should be able to withstand criticisms, and also see and respond to the merits of criticisms
for the betterment of themselves, their business, and their stakeholders.
[20] This was a large part of my motivation to write Better Thinking, Better Results ; to show, in unambiguous terms, the financial and non-
financial benefits of the Lean management system. See B. Emiliani, with D. Stec, L. Grasso, and J. Stodder, Better Thinking, Better
Results: Case Study and Analysis of an Enterprise-Wide Lean Transformation , 2nd Edition, 2007, The CLBM, LLC, Kensington, Conn.
[21] F.W. Taylor, “On the Art of Cutting Metals,” Trans. ASME , Vol. 28, pp. 31-350, 1907
[22] U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
[23] M.L. Emiliani, "Lean Behaviors," Management Decision , Vol. 36, No. 9, pp. 615-631, 1998
[24] "The Toyota Way 2001," Toyota Motor Corporation, internal document, Toyota City, Japan, April 2001
[25] B. Emiliani, REAL LEAN: Understanding the Lean Management System , The CLBM, LLC, Kensington, Conn., 2007.